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Barnet: Barnet: Gun Control Laws Violate the Second Amendment

Gun "Control" Laws Violate
the Second Amendment and
May Lead to Higher Crime Rates
Todd Barnet*
I. INTRODUCTION

Twenty-seven words of a Constitutional provision have generated literally
dozens of law review articles and academic commentaries throughout the past
decade.' In the last five years alone, numerous articles were published on the
subject of the Second Amendment.2 New empirical data released recently
indicate that firearms commonly are used for self-protection by law-abiding
citizens Such hard evidence refutes a popular argument of gun control
advocates that firearms have no utility but only contribute to violence in the
society, as these studies support the conclusion that weapons are in fact
predominantly used for self-defense. Thus, proposals to tighten gun controls
aimed at disarming large segments of the population are likely to affect the
number of prospective victims who would be deprived of an opportunity for selfprotection, resulting in an increased social cost.

* Associate Professor of Law, Faculty, Lubin School of Business, Legal Studies
and Taxation, Pace University; J.D., 1974, Brooklyn Law School; A.B., 1971, University
of Southern California; Mr. Barnet also practices criminal defense law in New York.
1. The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well-regulated militia being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. To list only some of the recent articles on this subject, see, e.g., Clayton E.
Cramer & David B. Kopel, "ShallIssue": The New Wave ofConcealedHandgunPermit
Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679 (1995); Eric Gorovitz, CaliforniaDreamin': The Myth of
State Preemption ofLocal FirearmRegulation, 30 U.S.F.L. REV. 395 (1996); Gary Kleck
& Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense
With a Gun, 86 J. CRmv. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995); David B. Kopel, et. al., A Tale
of Three Cities:the Right to BearArms in State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1177
(1995); John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, andRight-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997); Michael J. Quinlan, Is There a
NeutralJustificationforRefusing to Implement the Second Amendment or is the Supreme
Court Just "Gun Shy"?, 22 CAP. U.L. REv. 641 (1993); Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical
Guide to the SecondAmendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461 (1995); Gregory Lee Shelton, In
Search of the Lost Amendment: ChallengingFederalFirearmsRegulation Through the
"State Right" Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 105
(1995); William Van Alstyne, The SecondAmendment and the PersonalRight to Arms,
43 DuKE L. J. 1236 (1994); Thomas J. Walsh, The Limits and Possibilitiesof Gun
Control, 23 CAP. U.L. REv. 639 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Kleck, supra note 2, at 151.
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The recent flurry of regulatory activity regarding possession of firearms, at
the federal,4 state, and local levels,5 warrants close examination of the
permissible scope of firearms regulation in the United States. Much of this gun
control activity is driven by politics and emotion,6 and is not necessarily based
on scientific evaluation of the utility of gun ownership in this country.
Therefore, the recent empirical data regarding actual gun use patterns, which
corroborate the view that gun ownership should be encouraged as a policy
matter, may result in a rational policy-based approach to gun regulation,
compared to the existing patchwork of Second Amendment case law. From a
legal standpoint, the analysis of the United States Constitution and the existing
federal and state case law lends support to the view that the right to bear arms
is a fundamental right guaranteed to individual citizens.
Part II of this Article examines the legal implications of the absence of a
governmental duty to protect individual citizens and posits that effective selfdefense may be maintained only by an individual himself.
Part I of this Article, while generally relying on the accepted groundwork
of scholarship loosely named the "standard model," which argues that the
Second Amendment creates an individual right, as opposed to a collective right,
to bear arms,7 sets forth the analytical framework for interpreting the Second
Amendment and highlights the lack of clarity in interpretation of the Second
Amendment in the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence. This Article
further explores an apparent parallel in the present state of legal thinking
regarding the right to bear arms with the evolution of First Amendment
jurisprudence which, being indisputably an individual fundamental right, still is
subject to regulation by the federal and state governments with respect to the
time, place and manner of the exercise of that right.' The permissible scope of
such reasonable time, place and manner regulation under the First Amendment
has been delineated by the Supreme Court over time. An analogous approach
is appropriate for the Supreme Court in the case of the Second Amendment,
including a clarification that the right to bear arms under the federal Constitution

4. See infra note 28. See also Violent Crime Reduction Act of 1997, S. 137, 105th
Cong., reprinted in TAX NOTES, Feb. 4, 1997, at 24 (proposed legislation by Sen.
Moynihan to heavily tax firearm ammunition and to ban certain kinds of ammunition
altogether).
5. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-202 (1996) (prohibiting possession of certain
types of assault weapons); Michael Janofsky, In Virginia, County Seeks Weapons Banfor
Centers, N.Y. TIMEs, March 23, 1997, at A18 (describing gun control proposals in
Fairfax county, Virginia).
6. See, e.g., Marvin H. Morse, Terrorin the Pocket: Carying Concealed,43 FED.

LAW. 2 (1996) (describing the daily "terror by gunfire" in the United States).
7. See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, That Every Man Be Armed 7 (2d ed.

1994).
8. See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). See also discussion
in Part III, infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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is a fundamental right enforceable by individual citizens. The patchwork of case
law generated by the lower federal and state courts is further examined in Part
IV.
Lastly, Part V of this Article explores the recent legislative changes
occurring in many states of the Union as a response to the increased federal
regulation of firearms possession, including the phenomenon of the "shall issue"
legislation that has liberalized the issuance of concealed weapons in many states
for individual self-defense, and which generally makes purchasing a weapon
about as easy as obtaining a driver's license. The recent wave of the "shall
issue" laws may be viewed as a reaction by the state legislatures to the
uncertainty regarding the status of the right to bear arms under federal law.9
This Article concludes by arguing that the Second Amendment should be
interpreted as protecting a fundamental right of individuals, due to the right of
citizens to have access to firearms for personal protection. Statutory and
decisional law of some states on the issue of firearm ownership may be a model
for a regulatory framework regarding firearms. Should the citizenry, however,
wish to restrict the possession of deadly weapons, a Constitutional amendment,
rather than confusing and historically inaccurate interpretations of the Second
Amendment, appears to offer the most appropriate course of action.
II. THE GOVERNMENT Is NOT BOUND TO PROTECT
INDIVIDuAL CITIZENS AND THEREFORE WE ALL HAVE
AN INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
Generally, American legal theory does not recognize any duty owed by the
government to protect particular individuals from harms inflicted by other
private individuals, although the government is obligated to protect the
population as a whole. In light of the continuing lack of clarity regarding the
right of an individual citizen to bear arms for self-protection, such governmental
immunity from claims by victims of violent crimes makes a citizen defenseless
against violence. At the same time, the individual is uncertain whether arming
himself will make him a "criminal" in the eyes of the legal system.

9. As discussed below in Part IM,the United States Supreme Court, although
indicating in several cases its view that the Second Amendment protects an individual
citizen's right to bear firearms, has never addressed this issue directly.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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A. No GovernmentalDuty to Protect
In several reported cases, plaintiffs used the federal civil rights statute 0 to
sue the government for failure to protect against various forms of violence.
Until very recently, the courts, in most circumstances, uniformly refused to
impose a duty to protect on the government or its agents in the absence of an
affirmative act undertaken by the government that would place the victim in a
position where he would no longer be able to protect himself.
Clearly, one of the most egregious cases of the government's failure to
protect was described by the United States Supreme Court eight years ago in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,"' a case that
involved a father's repeated physical abuse of his three-year-old child. State
social services personnel had ample evidence that the father was severely
beating the child, but took no action despite multiple requests for legal
protection. After the continuous beatings rendered the child permanently
retarded, the child's guardian brought a lawsuit against the state authorities for
failure to protect against a harm which was known to the state. The plaintiff
argued that the state placed the child in peril by awarding custody of the child
to the father after the child's parents divorced. The plaintiff argued that having
performed such an affirmative act, the state should be held liable if later it failed
to protect the child from the person to whom it entrusted the child.
The Seventh Circuit was unmoved by this argument when it decided the
case on appeal from the district court. In what became one of the most
frequently quoted passages regarding a "fundamental principle of American law
that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public
services, such as police protection, to any individual citizen,"'" the federal court
observed that "[t]he Due Process Clauses [of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments] generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even
where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or property interests of
which the government itself may not deprive the individual."' 3
The holding in DeShaney does indeed reflect the prevailing status of the
law at both federal and state levels. Following a number of United States
Supreme Court cases, "4 federal and state courts consistently have held that the

10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured."
11. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
12. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1981).
13. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
14. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (no constitutional
duty for the state to provide services for those within its borders); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297,318 (1980) (no obligation to fund abortion or other medical services under Due
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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government owes no duty to provide police protection to residents within its
jurisdiction. The courts found that to place such an affirmative duty on the
government would expose it to a whirlwind of claims by victims of crime. As
the First Circuit Court of Appeals expressed in a case in which a state
government was sued for failure to protect a victim murdered by a prison inmate
on furlough, "[w]hat the state has done is fail to provide the victim
protection-a failure which, though perhaps wrong in our view, is not a violation
of the due process clause any more than is a fireman's nondeliberate error in
failing to rescue someone from a burning building."' 5
This "fundamental principle of American law" (i.e., the absence of a
general duty to protect citizens) warrants critical re-examination in light of the
increasing attempts to limit a citizen's access to firearms for self-protection. The
haphazard legislative and judicial activity aimed at restricting the types of arms
available to the populace underlines the conclusion that the pervasive influence
of the DeShaney principle in the contemporary American jurisprudence warrants
wider, rather than more restricted, availability of firearms for private protection.
If the government effectively disarms the people by restricting access to firearms
for personal protection, it should not be shielded from liability to crime victims
who, having no alternative means of defending their families and themselves16
against violence, are compelled to rely on the government for such protection.
B. Government's Monopolization of Means ofSelf-Defense
In analyzing the case law that discusses the "fundamental principle of
American jurisprudence," it is important to remember that, in situations like
DeShaney, the government did not actively seek to deprive the citizen of any

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,74 (1972) (no
obligation to provide adequate housing under the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714,720 n.10 (1st Cir. 1986). See also
Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988) (decision by a city fire
department's dispatcher to refuse to send a fire brigade to extinguish a fire which caused
a woman's death held not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
16. The Seventh Circuit has summarized the current law as holding that "there is
no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals
or madmen. It is monstrous ifthe state fails to protect its residents against such predators
but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we
suppose, any other provision of the Constitution." Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618
(7th Cir. 1982). The "fundamental principle of American jurisprudence" appears to hold
ground, notwithstanding some recent indication that at least in the area of domestic
violence some courts may be willing to permit victims of domestic violence to sue police
departments in cases of refusal to protect. See, e.g., Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 633 N.E.2d
1380 (11. App. Ct. 1994) (county officials liable for failing to prevent abduction of a
victim although the officials were on notice that the victim had been threatened by the
perpetrator), afd, 659 N.E.2d 1322 (Ill. 1995).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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means of protection. The government did fail to act to fend off the harm
threatening a particular individual, but, in general, state spousal or child antiabuse laws are designed to protect individuals who often are dependent on their
abusers. 7 For example, a criminal case could have been timely commenced
against Joshua DeShaney's father for child abuse. Ultimately, if other attempts
to diffuse the situation fail, the victim may leave the area where the perpetrator
resides or operates to avoid the confrontation. In the case of gun control laws,
however, the individual victim cannot avoid the encounter with the perpetrator
because crime and violence are widespread. The change of residence, for
example, would only reduce the probability of becoming a victim of a crime,
without completely eliminating such danger. Because each encounter with a
violent criminal is potentially fatal, reliance on the good will and omnipotence
ofthe government in preventing crime is unwarranted. An individual should be
able to defend himself if the need arises, lest waiting for the government to
protect result in incurable harm. During the time it takes the police to respond
to an emergency call for help, for example, the harm already has been done. The
police are primarily a reactive, not a proactive force.
If private individuals have to rely on self-protection, is the purposeful
action of the government to deprive citizens of the means to defend themselves
actionable under the rationale of DeShaney and its progeny? Arguably,
restrictive gun control laws that disable people in the face of potentially fatal
violent encounters, which are abundant in modem urban life, exceed the
governmental inaction that was held to be permissible in DeShaney.' Such state
monopolization of means of protection available to individuals transgresses the
scope of permissible regulation in other areas, such as abortion. In self-defense
situations, lives of individuals may be at stake because of the immediacy of
potential harm and the inadequacy of response by an unarmed citizen facing a
criminal attack.' 9
17. To illustrate, the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102
(West 1996) states as its purpose, inter alia, "recogni[tion of] domestic violence as a
serious crime against the individual and society which ... promotes a pattern of
escalating violence which frequently culminates in intra-family homicide ......
18. Cases tend to emphasize the government's lack of purposeful action. See, e.g.,
Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983) ("It was the claimants' tragic misfortune
to be randomly victimized by the depredations of a criminal who was subject, but not
subjected, to the effective control of the state."). As empirical data indicate, however, the
ability of an individual to resist a criminal attack (for example, by displaying or actually
using a firearm) may significantly affect the probability that the potential "victim" will
remain unharmed in such an encounter. See infra Part V.
19. The well-being of poor women arguably may be threatened by intrusive
regulation of abortion, as poor women would not be able to afford to travel to a less
restrictive jurisdiction to perform an abortion, while more affluent women would be able
to travel to less restrictive states. This interrelationship between governmental regulation
and the impact on the well-being of an individual is, however, much more attenuated than
with respect to firearms regulation, where governmental restrictions would immediately
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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Any policy alternative falling short of entrusting private individuals with
firearms and promoting reasonable self-reliance would in theory impose an
enormous burden on the government to provide comprehensive protection to
citizens. In selecting venues to maintain order in society and to protect an
individual citizen from private violence, the government may choose to: 1)
monopolize the means of armed defense otherwise available to the public; 2)
arm every individual and withdraw itself from the business of protecting the
public altogether; or 3) maintain a combination of the first two options. If the
government were required to monopolize self-defense, prohibiting any means
of private self-protection, such monopolization of public security would appear
to be an inefficient use of governmental resources, perhaps possible only in a
totalitarian state. If, on the other hand, the government were to provide the
public the means to arm itself for self-defense, an individual would be more
likely to put up resistance, or at least a credible threat of such resistance, if
attacked by a criminal. The current gun control laws in many jurisdictions
(particularly in large cities where the probability of being victimized is the
highest and the firearm controls are the toughest) effectively put citizens at the
mercy of criminals while the state asserts its immunity from responsibility for
protection of the public. Once again, this Article suggests that the adequate
remedy may be a clarification of the legal doctrine treating the right to bear arms
as a fundamental right antedating, and yet protected by, the Second Amendment,
and enforceable by individual citizens against both the federal and state
governments.
Ill. INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The Second Amendment has been dubbed one of the most poorly drafted
provisions in the United States Constitution. 0 It has been subject to various
interpretations. The only proposition that the advocates of differing views about
the right to bear arms appear to agree upon is that the language of the Second
Amendment does not clearly indicate what is protected under the firearms
clause.2'

correspond, as the studies detailed infra Part V indicate, to an increased threat to life and
health.
20. Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637,
644 (1989) ("No one has ever described the Constitution as a marvel of clarity, and the
Second Amendment is perhaps one of the worst drafted of all its provisions ....).
21. See, e.g., Halbrook, supra note 7, at ix (noting that, in light of the unclear
language of the firearms clause "the lack of attention to the meaning of the Second
Amendment seems inexplicable").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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A. Non-Incorporationof the Second Amendment
Whether the Second Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, is
"incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, applies not only
to the federal but also to state governments has been hotly debated in the Second
Amendment jurisprudence. It has been established that not all of the first ten
amendments of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states, 2 although in the
early development of the Fourteenth Amendment a powerful argument was
made in favor of the incorporation of all provisions of the Bill of Rights.23
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the High Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.24
Throughout the early case law, the Justices apparently did not see the need to
decide the incorporation issue because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment had been read expansively to include various rights and privileges
in the general purview of "liberty." Rather, the Court engaged in an extensive
analysis of the meaning of "liberty" and the scope of interests protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' In a sense, the dynamics of "selective incorporation"
largely have been dictated by expediency rather than a principled doctrinal
approach. The incorporation debate regarding the Second Amendment should
be analyzed in the context of constitutional thinking regarding the Due Process
Clause and the concept of substantive due process in the early years of this
century.
Furthermore, because the provisions of the Bill of Rights largely concern
criminal justice, historically the Supreme Court did not consider incorporation
of those provisions into the Fourteenth Amendment a priority before the era of

22. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (Eighth Amendment's ban on
excessive bails); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (Fifth Amendment's
prohibition of double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (noting
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects: (1) the First
Amendment rights of free speech, press, and religion; (2) the Fourth Amendment rights
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have illegally obtained
evidence suppressed at trial; (3) the Fifth Amendment rights to be compensated for
property taken by the state and to resist self-incrimination; and (4) the Sixth Amendment
rights to a public and speedy jury trial, to counsel, to confront witnesses, and to
compulsory process to obtain witnesses); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(freedom from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
23. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Bill of Rights should be fully incorporated based on the "original
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people of the nation the

complete protection of the Bill of Rights").
24. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243,247 (1833) (amendments to the Constitution
are not applicable to the states, but only constrain the federal government).
25. For an example of such expansive use of the substantive due process and the
analysis of the meaning of "liberty," see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right
to counsel in a criminal prosecution).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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the expansive use of federal powers to regulate the traditionally state-dominated
field of criminal law.26 Analogously to the creation of the federal statutory
criminal law, which preempted to a certain extent the traditional state criminal
law, the federal regulation of firearm use has expanded dramatically in the recent
decades. 27
The exclusion of the Second Amendment from incorporation is somewhat
illogical given that most of the Bill of Rights provisions have been incorporated
within the last hundred years.28 More importantly, judicial standards for the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights provisions in the Fourteenth Amendment
clearly warrant full incorporation of the Second Amendment.29 The current state
of the constitutional jurisprudence regarding the right to bear arms closely
parallels judicial thinking with respect to First Amendment liberties at the

26. For example, the exclusion of a coerced confession by a defendant in a state
criminal trial was first required through the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936), the Self-Incrimination Clause was incorporated
in 1964 by Malloy v. Hogan,378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), and the prohibition against unlawful
searches and seizures was made applicable to the states in 1961 by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
27. Some of the recent examples, starting with the National Firearms Act of 1934,
26 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5871 (1994), include the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968,42 U.S.C. § 3701-3797 (1994); the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921928 (1994); The Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986, amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 922930; the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994); the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994), and the Public
Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act of 1994, amending 18 U.S.C. § 922
(1994).
28. See Reynolds, supranote 2, for a view that the selective incorporation doctrine
should not be accepted in the case of the Second Amendment. The Fourteenth
Amendment has been held to protect citizens against many forms of state action. See
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (right to a speedy and public trial);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (same); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
(right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965) (right to confrontation of opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6
(1964) (the Fifth Amendment right to be free of compelled self-incrimination); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any
evidence illegally seized); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (the rights of speech and
press); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (the right to
compensation for property taken by the state).
29. See Quinlan, supranote 2, at 672. Quinlan argues that the Second Amendment
fully meets the three standards for incorporation enunciated by the Supreme Court, most
notably the standard requiring that a particular provision of the Bill of Rights be implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty and so rooted in the American tradition and people's
conscience as to be regarded fundamental, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324
(1937), and the standard requiring the right at issue to be fundamental to the American
scheme ofjustice, see Duncan v. Louisiana,391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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beginning of this century. To illustrate, in the early nineteenth century the High
Court held that the provisions of the Bill of Rights were inapplicable to the state
and local governments.3" In another case, United States v. Cruikshank,3" the
Supreme Court ruled that the provisions of the First and Second Amendments
were inapplicable to states and, thus, limited only the powers of the federal
government.
The incorporation debate regarding the First Amendment attracted public
attention in the 1920s when the Justices decided Gitlow v. New York, a First
Amendment case in which the Supreme Court simply assumed, without
explanation, that the Fourteenth Amendment made the right to free speech
applicable to the states.32 Subsequent First Amendment case law gradually
developed into what is now known as the contemporary First Amendment
jurisprudence, but only after overcoming the contrary view that the Bill of
Rights applies to only the federal government.33 The extension of the First
Amendment protection of free speech against state regulation through the Due
Process Clause happened largely after the demise of substantive due process in
the 1930s and the abandonment by the Court of its expansive interpretation of
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment context.34
In short, the Supreme Court should provide a definitive ruling incorporating
the Second Amendment into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the holdings in early pre-incorporation cases such as
Cruikshank are now inconsistent with modem Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. The High Court, which "has not hesitated to re-examine past
decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the
preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers
when they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme,"35 should
analyze the history of the constitutional debates accompanying the adoption of
the Bill of Rights and, specifically, the Second Amendment.36

30. Barron v. Baltimord, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
31. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875). See also Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922) (First Amendment only applies to
the federal government).
32. "For present purposes we-may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press... are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due
process clause." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
33. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (observing that the Framers intended the First Amendment to apply only
to the federal government, and limitations upon the states with respect to First
Amendment guarantees derive from its "incorporation" into the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. See supranote 25.
35. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
36. See Don B. Kates, Jr., HandgunProhibitionand the OriginalMeaning of the
SecondAmendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204,221 (1983) (describing "universal belief' of
the Founding Fathers in armed citizenry as a guarantee of liberty during the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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The Second Amendment jurisprudence largely continues in its inchoate
state today due to the lack of an authoritative interpretation of its meaning. The
right to bear arms should be pron6unced a fundamental right and fully
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, as has already occurred in the
case of the First Amendment. The explosion of crime in the last two decades
and the ongoing expansion of the powers of the federal government, which result
in a gradual usurpation of the traditional domains of state power,37 are important
reasons necessitating such clarification of the Second Amendment.
A central interpretive issue is raised by the question of whether the Second
Amendment provides for a fundamental right, regulation of which is subject to
stringent constitutional limitations. The Supreme Court has not ruled
definitively on this question so far, alth6ugh in several cases the Court did
indicate that it considered the right to bear arms provided for in the Second
Amendment a fundamental right.3"
The viability of an interpretation of the Second Amendment as a selfenforceable fundamental right was demonstrated in a dissenting opinion in
Quiliciv. Village ofMorton Grove,39 where Judge Coffey of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals viewed the right to bear arms as one of the "basic human
freedoms." In Quilici, a gun owner brought an action against a municipality
which enacted an ordinance prohibiting possession of handguns within its
borders. 4 The dissent argued that every individual is entitled to self-defense and
the protection of "loved ones" and that such right is inherent in the concept of
natural law. In addition, Judge Coffey considered the village ordinance invalid
because it impermissibly interfered with the individual right to privacy.4

Constitutional debates and the adoption of the Bill of Rights).
37. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Guns, Militia and Oklahoma City, 62
TENN. L. REV. 443, 448 (1995) (showing that the scope of regulation by the federal
government has expanded dramatically in recent decades).
38. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (mentioning in dicta that the
right to bear arms was fundamental, together with voting, holding a union office or
practicing medicine).
39. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271-72 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Coffey, J., dissenting), cert. denied,464 U.S. 863 (1983).
40. The majority opinion, which found that the ordinance did not infringe upon the
rights protected by the Second Amendment, was criticized by one commentator as
displaying a "penchant for inaccuracy." See Robert Dowlut, Federal and State
ConstitutionalGuaranteesto Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 70 (1989).
41. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 278.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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C. The Second Amendment as a Guarantee
of an IndividualRight
Although the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms,42 legal academia generally
has argued that the individual right approach is consistent with the language of
the Second Amendment and its interpretations at the time the Bill of Rights was
drafted and debated.43
Contrasted with the individual right theory is the so-called state right
doctrine, which relies on the provisions of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution
establishing the power of Congress to call militia and to provide for arming and
disciplining of the militia.' The proponents of that theory argue that the purpose
of the Second Amendment was to guarantee that the federal government would
not be able to disarm state militias.45 Conversely, some early state decisions
suggested that the right to bear arms may have been intended only to protect the
rights of the states to maintain their military independence from the emerging
federal government.46

42. See infra Part II.E.
43. See, e.g., Halbrook, supra note 7, at 170 (the right to bear arms is the right of

the people which should be interpreted as an individual right consistently with other
provisions of the Constitution referring to the "people" as private citizens); Kates, supra
note 36, at 218 (same); Levinson, supranote 20, at 645 ("[I]t seems tendentious to reject
out of hand the argument that one purpose of the [Second] Amendment was to recognize
an individual's right to engage in armed self-defense against criminal conduct.").
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 sets forth the power of Congress "[t]o provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions." Art. I, § 8, cl. 16 authorizes Congress "[t]o provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed
in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment
of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress." Incidentally, Congress apparently views the Second
Amendment as protecting an individual right. The preamble to the Firearm Owners'
Protection Act of 1986 states that "[t]he Congress finds that-(1) the rights of
citizens---(A) to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution [and Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments] require additional
protection." See Pub. L. No. 99-308 (1986).
45. See, e.g., John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the
American Experience, 48 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 148, 155 (1971) (arguing that the Second
Amendment manifests the fear of the states of an oppressive federal power); Roy G.
Weatherup, StandingArmies andArmed Citizens: An HistoricalAnalysisof the Second
Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CoNST. L. Q. 961, 984 (1975) (same).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 948 (1976) (only states and state militia members have standing to assert the Second
Amendment); State v. Buzzard, 4 ARK. 18, 24-25 (1842) (Second Amendment and its
state constitutional analogs guarantee the right of the state to organize its own militia).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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An even more extreme variation of the state right reasoning, otherwise
known as the collective theory of the Second Amendment, is the interpretation
that the constitutional right to arms involves only "the people" as a whole, but
not the states or individual citizens.47 The people's right theory appears even
more illogical than the states' right doctrine because "the people," as a legal
concept, embraces everyone and no one at the same time. It is hard to imagine
that the Constitution would include a constitutional provision which would not
be enforceable by anyone.
The Framers may have intended to protect both individual liberty by
guaranteeing the right to gun ownership and state sovereignty by ensuring that
state militia would have able and "disciplined" members to defend the state in
the case of federal encroachment upon privileges of the states.48
Many legal scholars consider the Second Amendment as embodying a
structural view of the federalist state that differs from the traditional federal-state
government dichotomy. It has been argued that the Second Amendment
envisions a third "pole," the people, in the federal structure, the task of which is
to balance the other two in guarding against the possibility that a tyrannical
government may abolish individual liberties of citizens."9 The preservation of
firearms to the citizenry puts pressure on the government to adhere to democratic
processes out of fear of a popular uprising should the government degenerate
into a tyranny." This "right to a revolution" argument in construing the Second
Amendment also is consistent with the inalienable right to bear arms, which was
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in one of its early decisions.

47. That theory was articulated in Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905),
and apparently is dormant at the present time. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at

1244 (analyzing the Second Amendment as discrediting the early state right approach
because under that theory the right to bear arms would be unenforceable by anyone).
48. See Halbrook, supra note 7, at 89.

49. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 20, at 651 (construing the Second Amendment
as epitomizing the republican theory of popular counterbalance to the government). Such

argument appears to be supported by other provisions of the Constitution, namely, the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which envision the "people's power" as a check on the
government.
50. See, e.g., Cockrum v. State, 24 TaX. 394, 401 (1859) (Second Amendment is
"based on the idea, that the people cannot be effectually oppressed and enslaved, who are
not disarmed").

51. In the early Thirteenth Amendment case of Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856), Chief Justice Taney twice referred to the right to bear arms as an

individual right. He first observed that Negroes were not entitled to the "rights and
privileges" of citizens, including the right to "keep and carry arms wherever they went."
Id. at 416-17. Later in the opinion, the Court noted that "Congress [cannot] deny to the

people the right to keep and bear arms." Id. at 450.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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D. Definition ofMilitia
The importance of this facet of the private ownership of firearms as one of
the "checks and balances" in the Constitution relates to the proper role of
"militia" referred to in the Second Amendment. Historical analysis of the
Constitution indicates that the term "militia" was understood by the Framers to
embrace all white males of certain age who are suitable for military service.52
Today's military units that are frequently called "militias," established by the
federal government (the National Guard) and the states, are of a completely
different nature from the "militia" referred to by the Constitution.
It is clear that the current National Guard, which does not embrace all
eligible citizens, is not the "well-regulated militia" within the meaning of the
Second Amendment, and the United States Supreme Court essentially has
recognized this fact.53 In fact, federal law, as well as most state statutes,
recognizes an unorganized militia which is separate from the National Guard,
and which is composed of male members between the ages of seventeen to fortyfive.' Those militias are not covered by the provisions of the law related to the
maintenance and training of the National Guard. Commentators are in
agreement that the existence of the National Guard does not serve the goals of
preserving well-regulated state militias as mandated by the Second
Amendment.55 The present National Guard is a "select militia" which is largely
a federal force. Conversely, the Framers wished to establish5 6an all-inclusive
popular "genuine militia" of all men capable of bearing arms.

52. See, e.g., Dowlut, supra note 40, 15 at 66 n.44 ("well-regulated militia,"

understood at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights to mean a militia which is
comprised of people that have had military training).
53. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 341 (1990) ("militia," as
recognized in the Constitution, proved an unreliable fighting force which had to be
reformed).
54. See 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1994), which provides, inter alia, that the classes of
militia include the "organized militia" (the National Guard and the Naval Militia), and
the "unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not
members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia." Significantly, many state statutes
now include women within their definition of unorganized state militia. See Glenn H.
Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought

Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1737, 1761 n.80 (1995) (citing state constitutional
and statutory provisions). Compare with First Militia Law, 1 Stat. 271 (1792), which
defined militia as all "free able-bodied white male citizens." Clearly, such militia does

not exist anymore.
55. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 54, at 1760 (viewing the National Guard as
being different from the well-regulated militia prescribed by the Constitution).
56. See Stephen P. Halbrook, To Keep andBear TheirPrivateArms: The Adoption
of the Second Amendment, 1787-1791, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 13, 20 (1982) (referring to
RICHARD HENRY LEE'S, LETrERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER (1787-88), as admonishing
against Congress's power to establish a federal militia which would ultimately make state
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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Thus, the "well-regulated militia" provided for in the Second Amendment
is an entity different from the present National Guard. The ranks of loosely
defined state militias appear to be the only possible candidates that might be
considered for Second Amendment purposes because they include all eligible
citizens of the nation. Although the courts have discussed the status of the
National Guard with respect to specific state or federal laws, 57 the question of
what constitutes a well-regulated militia within the meaning of the Second
Amendment requires a thorough examination and understanding of the purpose
of the institution of state militias as a guarantee of state power against federal
regulation.
In sum, the reading of the Second Amendment that encompasses the
protection of a fundamental individual right is reinforced by the plain meaning
of the provision because "militia" in the Constitution refers to all people, and the
term "arms" includes, at the very least, all weapons that are necessary to the
militia service.58 Moreover, if the militia referred to in the Second Amendment
is no longer in existence, or is not active militarily, the right of individual
citizens to possess firearms to control the power of the government becomes
even more important as an institutional check against governmental power.
E. Supreme CourtJurisprudence
The Supreme Court largely has shied away from expressing a definitive
opinion regarding the meaning of the Second Amendment. During the last
century, the Court has decided only five cases on Second Amendment grounds,
although in several other decisions the Justices, in passing, mentioned their
views on the right to bear arms under the U.S. Constitution. So far, the High
Court has declined requests to review even complete prohibitions of possession
of firearms, 59 but the increasing regulation of the possession of firearms is likely
to compel the Court to address the Second Amendment controversy some time
in the near future as challenges to the power to regulate firearms asserted by the
government grow.

militias irrelevant).
57. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 156 S.E. 917, 919 (N.C. 1931) (holding that the
National Guard is a state organization for purposes of workmen compensation laws).
Another early state court decision discussed the delineation of powers among the federal
government and the states in matters of military policy. See State v. Johnson, 175 N.W.
589 (Wis. 1919) (holding that under the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, the
state may decide certain issues of military policy).
58. See Kates, supra note 36, at 214 (arguing that the textual analysis of the
Second Amendment leaves no ground for asserting that the Constitution does not protect
a fundamental individual right to bear arms).
59. See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (denying
certiorari); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968), appealdismissed, 394 U.S. 812
(1969) (dismissed for "want of a substantial federal question").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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The first Second Amendment case the Supreme Court decided, United
States v. Cruikshank,6° involved an indictment under a Louisiana state law which
prohibited interference with the "rights, immunities and privileges" of citizens,
including the rights to free speech and to bear arms. The Court in one paragraph
summarily dismissed the state's argument that the rights under the federal
Constitution were implicated when a group of people "banded together" to
harass two African-Americans. Regarding the right to bear arms, the Court
observed that "bearing arms for a lawful purpose... is not a right granted by
the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for
its existence."' Further,
[t]his is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the
powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their
protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it
recognizes, to what is called, .

municipal legislation."62

.

. the "powers which relate to merely

The observation that the right to bear arms predates the Constitution is
based on the natural right theoryk, which supports the view that the right to bear
arms was considered fundamental by the Cruikshankcourt.63
Furthermore, the view expressed in Cruikshank that the Fourteenth
Amendment added nothing to the protection of individuals against state
infringement of a fundamental right was prevalent in the early Supreme Court
jurisprudence. For example, the Court articulated a similar opinion in Permoli
v. New Orleans,a First Amendment case.' More importantly, in 1897 (after
Cruikshank), the Supreme Court decided its first case in which one of the Bill
of Rights provisions was held to be within the Fourteenth Amendment.65 That
treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment has been supplanted by the
66
incorporation doctrine in the context of other Bill of Rights provisions,
although the Court has not yet ruled on the application of the Fourteenth

60. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
61. Compare Cruikshank,92 U.S. at 542, with Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2
Litt.) 90, 92 (1822), an early state court decision which stated that the right to bear arms
"existed at the adoption of the [state] constitution."
62. Cruikshank,92 U.S. at 553.
63. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (Chase, J.) (principles of natural
law embodied in the fundamental rights provisions of the United States Constitution).
64. Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3How.) 589 (1845) (federal government has
no jurisdiction under the Constitution over a city ordinance infringing upon freedom of
religion).
65. That first "incorporation" case was Chicago, B. & R.Q. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action taking private
property without compensation).
66. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (listing the Bill of
Rights provisions incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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Amendment in the context of the right to bear arms. The importance of
Cruikshank,however, is in its language referring to the "people" and "fellow
citizens," which indicates that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right to bear arms.67
In Presserv. Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of a member
of an unorganized militia in Illinois, who, in violation of a state statute, paraded
on Chicago streets, "riding on horseback and in command" of a company of
people armed with rifles. Although the case has been considered as advancing
the state rights doctrine, a close reading of the opinion indicates that the
Supreme Court did not pass upon this issue. Rather, the Court's affirmance of
the conviction was based on the premise that the Illinois statute in question was
a valid exercise of the police power of the state to regulate militia. Indeed, the
statute did not prohibit any parades or drilling by unorganized militiamen, it
simply required that a license from the governor be obtained prior to the
intended military exercise.69
The court paid special attention to the provisions of the Illinois Military
Code, the statute in question, which defined the "Illinois State Militia" as all
able-bodied male citizens of the state between the ages of eighteen and forty-five
years, except exempted persons. The Code also set forth a separate "volunteer
active militia," a limited number of enlisted personnel. The Court did not view
the establishment of such selected militia on active duty as being contrary to the
constitutional mandate that all qualified citizens be subject to the militia duty.
The existence of two distinct organizations, the volunteer active militia and the
general state militia, manifested the difficulty of maintaining adequate military
preparedness by the general non-select militia alone, which comprised the ablebodied male population of the age of eighteen to forty-five. 0 In the Court's
opinion, "sections under consideration, which only forbid bodies of men to
associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in
cities and towns unless authorizedby law, do not infiinge the right of the people
to keep and bear arms."
It is difficult to see how this language denies
substance to the Second Amendment any more than the permissibility of the

67. In an opinion issued almost 20 years before Cruikshank,the Supreme Court
construed the phrase "the people" in the Second Amendment as referring to an individual
right. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) and text accompanying note
51.
68. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
69. Id. at 253 ([S]ection 5 of the Illinois Military Code provided that it "shall not
be lawful for any body of men whatever, other than the regular organized volunteer
militia of this state ....to associate themselves together... ,without the license of the
governor thereof ....).
70. See Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 341-45 (1990)
(describing the late nineteenth century efforts to maintain uniform state militia and ensure
military preparedness).
71. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264 (1886) (emphasis supplied).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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time, place and manner regulation of the free speech negates the First
Amendment.' It also is perfectly consistent with dicta in another decision of the
United States Supreme Court, Robertson v. Baldwin, where the Justices observed
that although the codification of the right to bear arms in the Bill of Rights was
intended to "embody certain guarantees and immunities which we had inherited
from our English ancestors," it "is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying
of concealed weapons." 73 In other words, the permissibility of regulation of the
manner in which firearms are carried, including the bearing of concealed
weapons, no more negates the Constitutional right to bear arms than the time,
place and manner regulation of the First Amendment liberties diminishes the
scope of Constitutional protection of the freedom of speech.
In the third case often mentioned in the nineteenth century saga of the
Second Amendment litigation, Miller v. Texas,74 the Supreme Court, without
laying out the facts of the case or much discussion, dismissed an appeal on
procedural grounds. The Court only mentioned that the case involved a claim
that the petitioner was denied the protection of the Second Amendment by a
Texas statute which forbade the carrying of weapons. As in Cruikshank, the
dismissal of the petition apparently reflected the Court's pre-incorporation view
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the states.
Relatively recently (by the standards of the Second Amendment
jurisprudence) the Supreme Court, in United States v. Miller,75 sustained a
conviction of two individuals who were transporting an unregistered shotgun in
76
interstate commerce in violation of the federal National Firearms Act.
Although the decision has been subject to various interpretations, 7" the Court's
opinion is, in reality, rather limited and does not indicate the Court's clear view
regarding the proper interpretation ofthe Second Amendment. The crucial part

72. Regulation of the time, place, and manner of exercising the rights protected by
the First Amendment is commonly accepted as valid. See, e.g., Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408 (1953) (upholding reasonable regulation of time, place,
and manner ofperforning religious services in public parks under the First Amendment).

See also Glenn H. Reynolds, A CriticalGuide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L.
REv. 461 (1995) (reasonable regulation of the right to bear arms does not negate
constitutional protection of the right).
73. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897).
74. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
75. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
76. Codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5871 (1994). The National Firearms Act
requires registration of all "firearms" (as defined in the statute), and is not limited to
weapons circulating in interstate commerce.
77. See, e.g., Dowlut, supra note 40, at 73-74. Dowlut interprets United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), as a case which is consistent with the individual right theory
because of the reluctance of the Justices to limit the right to firearms possession only to
members of an established militia. Dowlut, supra note 40, at 73-74.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/10
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of the opinion is contained in the following paragraph:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
"shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length" at this time has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a wellregulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument.
It is important to note that the inconclusiveness of the Supreme Court's
view regarding the Second Amendment as reflected in Miller may stem from
several procedural irregularities of the case. Both defendants in Miller appeared
pro se, without counsel. Crucial is the court's emphasis on the absence of any
evidence showing that the gun transported by the defendants could be used in
connection with militia activities. Such evidence, if produced by the defendants,
would have constituted an affirmative defense to the government's charge of the
violation of the statute, and the defendants bore the burden of proof on this
issue.7" It is also worth mentioning that the opinion cited, as "some of the more
important opinions and comments by writers," state court decisions several of
which held that the right to bear arms is an individual right under state
constitutional provisions."
The Supreme Court in Millerset forth what became known as the "civilized
warfare" test," which, in essence, provides that the constitutionally protected
firearms include those used by militiamen in "civilized warfare" and not those
utilized by ruffians, brawlers, or assassins. Although this is a certain limitation
on the scope of constitutional protection under the Second Amendment, it is
consistent with the power to regulate the use of weapons to prevent their

78. The Court simply assumed, without evidence to the contrary, that the firearms
in issue were unfit for militia purposes. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
79. Id. at 182 n.3. The opinion cites cases which are based on the individual right
interpretation of the Second Amendment, including: People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245
(Mich. 1931) (private individuals may bear any "commonly used" arms); Fife v. State,
31 ARK. 455, 460-61 (1876) (individuals may bear large firearms but not concealable
pocket weapons); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 158 (1840) ('CThe free white men
may keep arms to protect the public liberty, to keep in awe those who are in power, and
to maintain the supremacy of the laws and the constitution.").
80. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (protection of the Second Amendment is limited to
firearms used by militia members).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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misuse. 8' Most states, as described below, have adopted the civilized warfare
test in construing the arms clauses of state constitutions.82
In more recent times, the Supreme Court has avoided ruling on the Second
Amendment issues, utilizing other Constitutional provisions rather than the right
to bear arms in cases where firearm regulation was in issue."3 In fact, the High
Court has been very careful to avoid addressing the issue in situations where
reference to the Second Amendment would have supported a decision much
stronger than the convoluted argument advanced by the Court before.' Yet in
the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court regarding the scope of the
Constitutional protection under the Second Amendment, lower federal courts
somewhat hesitantly continue to apply the discredited "collective right"
81. To illustrate, a number of courts including the U.S. Supreme Court in Lewis v.
UnitedStates, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), upheld prohibitions under the federal and state law on
possession of firearms by convicted felons as reasonable regulation of the use of
weapons. See, e.g., People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975); State v. Comeau, 448
N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1989); State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987). It is untenable
to argue that somehow such permissible regulation undermines the sanctity of the Second
Amendment itself.
82. See, e.g., Seattle v. Montana, 919 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Wash. 1996) ("arms"
extends to weapons designed as such, and not to every utensil which might be used to
strike a person). See also State v. Swanton, 629 P.2d 98, 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)
("arms" are those weapons used in civilized warfare and not those used by ruffians,
brawlers and assassins); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876) ("arms" includes firearms used
in militia, not weapons customarily used in private quarrels or brawls such as a pocket
pistol); State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 224 (N.C. 1921) ("arms" includes pistol, but not
bowie knife, dirk, dagger, slung shot, loaded cane, or metallic knuckles); People v.
Persce, 97 N.E. 877, 877 (N.Y. 1912) ("arms" includes only legitimate weapons of
defense and protection, not instruments which are ordinarily used for criminal or
improper purposes); State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 1891) ("arms" in a
constitutional provision refers to weapons of war used by the militia). See also infra Part
W.C.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), partially invalidated as exceeding the
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
84. For example, in Staples v. UnitedStates, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), the Supreme
Court upheld a conviction for possessing an unregistered machine gun where the federal
government could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the
weapon he possessed was a "machine gun" as defined in the statute. Notwithstanding an
opportunity to examine the validity of the firearms registration provisions under the
Second Amendment, the Court's only reference to the right to bear arms was that "despite
their potential for harm, guns generally can be owned in perfect innocence." Staples,511
U.S. at 611. Compare with United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

426 U.S. 948 (1976), an analogous case involving a conviction for possessing a machine
gun which was not registered as required by the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§
5861 and 5871 (1996). In Warin the Sixth Circuit set forth a detailed analysis of the
Constitutional protection of the right to bear arms and concluded that federal regulation
of the firearms possession was not prohibited. Id.
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approach s or avoid ruling on the meaning of the Second Amendment to the
extent possible.86
Even though the Supreme Court has not addressed the Second Amendment
since Miller, in several cases it mentioned, in passing, its views on the nature of
the right to bear arms, repeatedly noting that it views the Second Amendment as
an individual right.87 The Court rested its conclusion on the construction of the
term "the people" in several provisions of the Bill of Rights.8 Consistent with
the views of legal academia that have asserted that "the people" connotes all
individual citizens protected under each respective amendment to the
Constitution, ina recent decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez the
Supreme Court confirmed that position in dicta.9° The statement in Verdugo also
implies the Court's view that the Second Amendment guarantees a fundamental
right. The Justices have indicated their support of this conclusion in the past,
repeatedly referring to the firearm clause of the Constitution in the same line as
the First Amendment and other guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are
uniformly considered to protect individual fundamental rights. 91

85. See, e.g., Pencak v. Concealed Weapon Licensing Bd., 872 F. Supp. 410,413
(E.D. Mich. 1994); Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Camp, 746 F. Supp. 1415,
1417 (E.D. Cal. 1990), affid, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992) (both cases holding that the
Second Amendment applies only to the federal government and not to the states). Some
federal district courts appear to treat the right to bear arms as no more than a legislative
grace. See, e.g., Bemis v. Kelley, 671 F. Supp. 837, 842 (D. Mass. 1987), af'd,857 F.2d
14 (1st Cir. 1988) ('The right to carry a firearm is regulated by statute in Massachusetts
and that right may be revoked for good cause at any time").
86. See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir.
1982) (refusing to discuss the merits of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)).
Compare with Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64
(1995) ("the [Second] [A]mendment does not confer an absolute individual right to bear
any type of firearm").
87. See infra notes 90 and 91.
88. See infra note 91.
89. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 36, at 218 (term "the people" in the First, Second,
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments connotes individual citizens).
90. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (Fourth
Amendment case where the Court interpreted the term "the people" in the Preamble and
the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments as a term of art referring to the
same connotation, an individual right).
91. Thus, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the
Court noted that:
the full scope of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
foufnd in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points
pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press,
and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
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To summarize, the Supreme Court should squarely address the baffling
interpretive problems of the Second Amendment to end the continuing
controversy and confirm the fundamental nature of the right to bear arms. One
observation that emerges from the Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence is
that the Justices apparently view the right to bear arms as an individual right
because the High Court has never questioned the individual petitioners' standing
to assert a Second Amendment right.92
IV. STATE REGULATION OF FIREARMS
As in the Second Amendment itself, provisions in state constitutions
guaranteeing the right to bear arms largely originated in the Anglo-American
common law.93 Early state constitutions adopted prior to the Civil War
contained a version of the right.94 Most states have adopted statutes regulating
the use and possession of firearms, and such statutes typically require that a
person wishing to acquire a firearm apply for a license.95 Until the recent wave
of statutes mandating the issuance of a license to qualified individuals, in many
jurisdictions the issuance of such licenses was discretionary and numerous news
reports indicate that gun permits under those discretionary powers were more
readily available to wealthy and well-connected persons rather than to residents

purposeless restraints.
See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (quoting the
above language from Uliman).
92. Conversely, the adoption of the "state right" theory would mandate the dismissal
of an individual's claim because only the states, under that doctrine, would be eligible to
sue for a violation of the right to bear arms. Compare with Cases v. United States, 131
F.2d 916,921-22 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied,319 U.S. 770 (1943) (Second Amendment
standing is limited to members of "military organizations" whose possession of firearms
advances the militia goals of the Second Amendment). However, Casesrelied on United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), in which the United States Supreme Court never
doubted that the defendants, who were not militia members, had standing to assert a
Second Amendment claim. Id. at 921.
93. Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976).
94. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroachmentsof the Crown on the Liberty of the
Subjects: Pre-RevolutionaryOrigins of the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV.
91, 119-23 (1989) (describing the adoption of early state constitutions and the Bill of
Rights). Halbrook mentions that in four (Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Vermont and

North Carolina) of the eight declaration of rights adopted by the states during the
Revolutionary period, the individual right to bear arms was explicitly recognized. Id. at
119.
95. See, e.g., N.Y. [PENAL] LAW § 400.00 (1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109
(West 1996). As discussed above in Part III, the regulation of the right to bear arms by
itself does not diminish Constitutional significance thereof. An analogy here may be
drawn with the First Amendment under which reasonable regulation of the time, place

and manner of exercising First Amendment rights is permissible. See supranote 72.
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who needed firearms for personal safety.96 The prevalent trend in recent years,
however, is the expansion of state firearms law to grant law-abiding citizens
easier access to firearms. Partly in response to the uncertainty regarding the
scope of the Second Amendment protection, and to some extent as a reaction to
a number of well-publicized cases in which state officials abused their
discretionary powers to issue gun permits, some states have amended their
constitutional provisions in relation to the right to bear arms, to explicitly
provide that the arms clause relates to the personal defense and protection of the
state, as well as recreational use, hunting and other lawful purposes. 97 In
addition, many states have adopted legislation liberalizing the carrying of
concealed weapons, and state courts have become more active in enforcing the
right to bear arms under state constitutional and statutory provisions.

A. State ConstitutionalProvisions
Currently, constitutional provisions in forty-three states explicitly protect,
to a varying degree, the right of the populace to bear arms. In seven states,
which include California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
and Wisconsin, the state constitutions are silent on the subject.98 A minority of

state constitutions repeat, with some variations, the "well-regulated militia"
clause of the federal Constitution." In several state constitutions, the "right to
bear arms" clauses specifically mention that the right to firearms exists for the
protection of an individual and the state,"° although, in some states, firearms

96. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, Elite in NYC Are PackingHeat, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 8, 1993, at 21.

97. For example, the New Mexico Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall
abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful
hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes." N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6.
This provision has been held to embrace broader protection of the right to bear arms than
the federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Dees, 669 P.2d 261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(describing the constitutional amendment of 1971 which explicitly added hunting and
recreational uses to the scope of protection under the arms clause of the New Mexico
Constitution). See also infra notes 99-104.
98. New York Civil Rights Law provides that "[a] well regulated militia being
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
cannot be infringed." See N.Y. [CIV. RIGHTs] LAW § 4 (McKinney 1992). In construing
this provision, New York state courts have used the language interpreting the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Citizens for a Safer Community
v. Rochester, 627 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (language of section 4 of the Civil
Rights Law to be interpreted identically with the Second Amendment).
99. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 17; N.C. CONST. art I,
§ 30; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
100. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ARIz. CoNST. art. II, § 26; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 15; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KY. CONST. art. I, § 1; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 6; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 21; S.D. CONST. art. VI,
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owned for certain other purposes also are subject to constitutional protection."°
In addition, several state constitutions specifically proclaim that the right
to bear arms belongs to an individual, rather than any collective body, such as
the state or the people as a whole. 2 Such provisions lend substantial support
to the individual theory of the constitutional right to bear arms because those
constitutional provisions were adopted after the federal Bill of Rights and, thus,
reflect the common understanding of the meaning of the federal Constitution. 3
An interesting feature of several state constitutions is an express
authorization of state legislatures to regulate the carrying of concealed
weapons.1 4 Tennessee and Texas constitutions further provide that regulation
of "wearing of arms" to prevent crime is permissible. 5 Those provisions
apparently reflect the fear that concealed weapons may contribute to gun
violence,"° although even this reason was insufficient to constitutionally ban the
use of concealed firearms completely.0 7 An outburst of state legislation
liberalizing the possession of concealed guns is analyzed in detail in Part IV.B,
infra.
Lastly, several states recently amended their constitutions to enhance
protection of the right to bear arms to private citizens. West Virginia added a
firearms clause to its constitution in 1986, thus making it more difficult to

§ 24; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 23; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; WYo.
CoNsT. art. I, § 24.
101. See COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 13 (defense of home, person and property, or in
aid of the civil power); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1 (defense of person, family, property and
the state, and lawful hunting, recreational and other lawful purposes); OKLA. CONST. art.
II, § 26 (defense of home, person or property, or in aid of the civil power); UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 6 (defense of the self, family, others, property or state). Massachusetts limits
constitutional protection to "common defense." MASS. GEN. LAws. Ch. 1, § 17 (West
1997). The Delaware, Nebraska, Nevada and New Mexico Constitutions add hunting,

recreational use, and all other lawful purposes to the list of protected firearm uses. See
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; NEV. CoNsT. art. I, § 11; N.M. CoNsT.

art. II, § 6.
102. See ALASKA CoNsT. art. I, § 19; ARIz. CoNsT. art. II, § 26; CONN. CONST. art.
I, § 15; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; UTAH CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
103. See Halbrook, supra note 7, at 124.
104. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; IDAHO CoNsT. art. I, § 11; LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CoNST. art. II, § 12;
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30.
105. See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
106. Warren Spannaus, State FirearmsRegulation and the Second Amendment, 6

HAMLINE L. REV. 383 (1983).
107. See, e.g., Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E.2d 1339, 1341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that a concealed weapon permit cannot be denied to a qualified individual upon
application under the Indiana Constitution because self-protection is a "proper reason"
for issuing a license).
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restrict possession and use of firearms by the legislature.0 8 In Maine, the
firearms clause of the state constitution was amended in 1987 after a public vote
whereby the words "for the common defense" were stricken from the text with
the intent to establish "for every citizen the individual right to bear arms, as
opposed to the collective right to bear arms for the collective defense. ' 9
Maine's highest court has confirmed that the 1987 amendment established an
individual constitutional right to possess and carry weapons, subject to
reasonable regulation by the state legislature."0

B. Concealed Weapons Legislation
Historically, carrying a concealed firearm, unlike bearing a weapon openly,
was a criminal offense in many states, due to the public fear of violence
involving deadly weapons."' The restrictions on concealed weapons were
112
justified much more readily than the limitations on carrying firearms openly.
Recently, however, a strong movement by the majority of the states to legalize
the carrying of concealed weapons in public places has developed. Several
commentators have suggested that such measures may be a reaction to the
increased federal regulation of firearms, particularly the recent adoption of the
Brady Handgun Control Act.' Other factors include the ambivalence with
which federal courts view the controversy surrounding the Second Amendment
in light of the absence of definitive pronouncements by the United States
Supreme Court,'1 4 and a reaction to the perceived abuse in the issuance of gun

108. See City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988) (construing
the right to bear arms as enacted in Article III, section 22 of the West Virginia
constitution).
109. Until the 1987 amendment, Article I, section 16 of the Maine Constitution
provided that "[e]very citizen has a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense;
and this right shall never be questioned." ME.CoNsT. art 1, § 16.

110. State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816 (Me. 1990) (prohibition of possession of a
firearm by a felon falls within the scope of permissible regulation of the individual right
to bear arms under the amended Article I, section 16 of the Maine constitution).
111. See, e.g., Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) (the court, while upholding a
restriction on carrying concealed weapons pursuant to a state statute, confirmed that the
right to bear arms belongs to an individual).
112. See, e.g., In re Brickey, 70 P. 609, 609 (Idaho 1902) (although a state statute
prohibiting bearing arms openly violated both the state and federal Constitutions,
regulation of concealed weapons was permissible).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
114. See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117
S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring state
law enforcement officers to receive reports from gun dealers regarding prospective
handgun sales, and to conduct background checks ofprospective purchasers, commandeer
state officials to administer a federal program in violation of principles of state
sovereignty). In Mack, which challenged the federal Brady Handgun Violence
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licenses in states and municipalities where the issuing officials still have

considerable discretion to reject firearms permit applications." 5
Prior to 1987, only Georgia, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, South Dakota and Washington had statutes that required state officials
to issue permits to carry concealed weapons to qualified individuals. In 1987,
Florida decided to curtail discretion of state authorities in issuing firearms
permits and enacted a so-called "shall carry" law which removed discretion from
state officials responsible for the issuance of firearm permits. Many states

followed the example.
7
6
As of 1996, only seven states in the United States, Illinois," Kansas,"
Missouri,"' Nebraska," 9 New Mexico, 2" Ohio,' and Wisconsin' totally
prohibited the carrying of concealed guns. A District of Columbia statute
requires that even handguns kept by owners at their homes must be locked up in
a separate storage space." Such regulation, of course, nullifies the efficiency
of firearms for self-defense for all practical purposes. In twelve states, the
carrying of concealed firearms has been legalized, provided a permit or license
is issued by the state on a showing of a specific need.'24 The administrative
practices of issuing licenses in those states vary greatly, with some counties

Prevention Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), as an impermissible regulation of firearms,
the Second Amendment was not even discussed because the Supreme Court viewed the
Brady Act as premised on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See also Frank v.
United States, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenge to the Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. §
922(s), which required background checks of potential handgun buyers, by county
sheriffs). Both cases were decided on Tenth Amendment grounds.
115. See, e.g., Cramer, supra note 2, at 686. See also Brevard County v. Bagwell,
388 So. 2d 645, 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (county firearm licensing ordinance
unconstitutional to the extent county commissioners may consider any factors they desire
in processing firearm permit applications).
116. 720 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1, 2 (West Supp. 1997).
117. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4201 (1995).
118. Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.030 (Supp. 1997).
119. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1202 (1995).
120. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2 (Michie 1994).
121. Omo REv. CODEANN. § 2923.12 (Anderson 1996).
122. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 941.23 (West 1996).
123. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3204 (1996). Firearms registered in the district prior
to 1976 have been grandfathered.
124. CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 12050 (Supp. 1998); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-12-105.1
(1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1441 (Supp. 1996); HAW. REv. STAT. § 134-9 (Supp.
1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.4 (1997); MD. CODE ANN. § 36E (1996); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 269, § 10 (1997); MICH. COM. LAWS § 28.426 (1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.66 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:151-41- 2A:151-48 (repealed) 2C:58-2 (1995);
N.Y. [PENAL] LAW § 400.00 (McKinney Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-11 (Supp.
1997). In Delaware, "shall issue" concealed weapons legislation (Delaware Personal
Protection Act of 1996, Del. H.B. 511) was defeated in 1996.
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within a particular state being more restrictive in regulating firearms and others
being more liberal.125 The statutes may prescribe specific requirements that
would qualify the applicant for such a permit, for example, handling large
amounts of cash in a commercial establishment. The burden to establish the
requisite need is usually on the applicant and varies depending on the
jurisdiction. For example, in New York the burden of showing the need is
"'
generally so high that it is very difficult to obtain a concealed gun permit. 26
The remaining thirty-one states liberally grant a license to carry a concealed
weapon, except to such applicants as minors, felons, substance abusers or the
27
mentally disabled, on a showing of a lawful purpose such as self-defense.
Within this group, Vermont does not require a license or a permit to carry a
concealed firearm at all because the right to bear arms under the Vermont
constitution has been broadly interpreted by the state courts. 28 By statute,

125. See Cramer, supranote 2, at 710 (describing certain counties in large states

such as California and New York which almost completely refuse to issue firearm
licenses). See also Lott, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that respondents to a nation-wide gun
use survey uniformly indicated that most populous counties had by far most restrictive
practices in the issuance of firearm permits); Sam Howe Verhovek, States Seek to Let
Citizens Carry Concealed Weapons, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1995, at Al, B8 (describing

refusal of ajudge in Clarke county, Virginia, to issue a gun permit to Oliver North under
the pretext that North was not of "good character").
126. See Cramer, supra note 2, at 684.
127. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-73 (Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.700 (Michie
1996); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (West Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-15202 (Michie Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206 (West 1994); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 790.06 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODEANN. § 43-38-10 (1994); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-3302 (1997); IND. CODE ANN § 35-47-2-3 (Michie Supp. 1997); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN § 237.110 (Michie Supp. 1996) (new statute authorizing liberal grant of permits to
carry concealed weapons became effective Oct. 1, 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95
(Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2003 (Supp. 1997); MIss. CODE ANN. § 459-101 (Supp. 1997); MONT. CODEANN. § 45-8-321 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350
(1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:6 (Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269 (1996);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03 (1995); OKLa. STAT.ANN. tit. 21, § 1290.3 (West Supp.
1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.291 (1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109 (West Supp.
1997); S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 23-31-215 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §

23-7-8 (Michie 1998); TENN. CoDEANN. § 39-17-1351 (Supp. 1996); TEX. [PENAL] CODE
ANN. § 46.02 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704 (Supp. 1996); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.41.070 (West 1998); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-4 (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 6-8-104 (1997).
128. Chapter I, Article 16 of the Vermont Constitution provides, inter alia, that
"the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state......
This clause has been interpreted as consistent with carrying concealed firearms in a case
in which the Vermont Supreme Court expansively read the right to arms provision of the
Vermont Constitution. See State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610 (Vt. 1903).
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Vermont prohibits concealed carrying of a weapon only if the carrying person
has "the intent or avowed purpose of injuring a fellow man...., 129
Even under the new concealed weapons legislation, some statutes
apparently allow state officials issuing gun permits a certain degree of discretion,
which may lead to arbitrary denials of gun permits. To illustrate, while state
authorities in New Hampshire liberally grant licenses to carry firearms, a recent
court decision has held that state law does not require the state issuing
authorities to continue such liberal practices. 30 Similarly, in Pennsylvania,
where a new law generally made the issuance of concealed firearms mandatory
to qualified applicants, the police commissioner of Philadelphia retains
discretion to deny a permit application to a city resident unless "the applicant is
a suitable individual to be licensed.'' The statute does not provide criteria for
determining whether a particular applicant is "suitable."
Two states, Texas and Georgia, recently enacted concealed weapons
legislation."3 News reports indicate that shortly after the enactment, large
numbers of residents availed themselves of the liberalized permit application
procedures under those statutes.' Even though empirical studies estimate that
the legalization of concealed firearms may prompt as much as four percent of the
population in the state affected to apply for a concealed gun permit,' 34 that
number is insubstantial compared to the overall adult population in the United
States. In any event, the deterrent effect of the concealed firearm laws appears
to be considerable due to many criminals' fear that their potential victim might
be armed. Overall, the surge in gun ownership due to the enactment of the "shall
carry" laws appears to vary from state to state.135 Studies conducted so far fail
to show that measures such as the Georgia legislation, which was enacted to
clarify and give full effect to the existing state law regulating the carrying of

129. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (1991).
130. See Conway v. King, 718 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (D.N.H. 1989) (holding that
conferring broad discretion on state officials with respect to firearm licensing does not
make state statute unconstitutionally vague).
131. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109 (West Supp. 1997). Gun permits issued
elsewhere in the state, however, are valid in Philadelphia. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6109(a) (West Supp. 1997). Thus, the utility of those discretionary powers reserved to
the Philadelphia police commissioner appears to be limited.
132. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-38-10 (1994); TEX. [PENAL] CODE ANN. § 46.02 (West
Supp. 1998).
133. See Texas ConcealedWeapon Law FinishesFirst Year, West's Legal News,
Jan. 6, 1997, availableat 1997 WL 2061. The number of applicants for a concealed gun
permit in Texas appears to have rapidly risen after the passage of the concealed firearms
statute (to over 1% of adult population), and may be expected to remain at that level. Id.
134. See Cramer, supra note 2, at 679-80.
135. For example, the number of concealed permits in Oregon increased in 1994
by 50%, whereas in Pennsylvania by a mere 16%. See Lott, supra note 2, at 34. Oregon
adopted its concealed firearm permit law in 1990, and Pennsylvania in 1989. Id. at 12.
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concealed firearms that dates back to the 1830s,'36 may result in wide-spread gun
violence which will negate the benefits of increased individual protection to gun
permit holders.
Possession or carrying of firearms also may be regulated separately by local
or municipal ordinances, particularly in large cities, or by counties. 137 Several
states, however, explicitly prohibit counties and municipalities within their
boundaries from acting upon matters of firearm regulation.13 Such regulation
may be more restrictive than the applicable state rules. 1 39 Overall, the additional
layer of regulation only adds to the hodgepodge of rules, making compliance
with the law more difficult. One of the most restrictive municipal ordinances in
the nation is in effect in New York City, where "[t]he possession of a handgun
license is a privilege rather than a right. ' 140 In New York City, the issuance of
a license to carry a firearm is in the discretion of the City Police Commissioner.
An issued license may be revoked at any time, 14 ' and the Commissioner's
discretion is "uncircumscribed."' 42 Although many retail business owners
carrying substantial amounts of cash are routinely denied gun permits on the
grounds that they fail to show "true need" for a firearm, at the same time there
are numerous reports that gun licenses in New York are easily available to the
city's high and mighty. 43

136. Rachelle R. Green, Offenses Against Public Order and Safety: Providefor
Specific Means of CarryingConcealedWeapons, 13 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 123, 124 (1996)

(the amended law allows carrying firearms in shoulder or belt holster or otherwise
concealed on the person's body, and the transporting of loaded weapons in a car by any
unlicensed person).
137. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-523 (West 1997) (authorizing
county sheriffs to issue concealed gun permits).
138. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 65.870 (Michie 1994). Comparewith WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 35.22.280(35) (West Supp. 1997) (municipalities are authorized to
enact needed police regulations to punish practices dangerous to public safety, and
preserve the public peace).
139. See, e.g., Cramer, supra note 2, at 683 (describing, as an example, licensing
practices in the state of California and the City of Los Angeles). In the latter jurisdiction,
firearm licenses have been issued only in very rare circumstances to well-connected
persons. Cramer, supra note 2, at 683.
140. Sewell v. City ofNew York, 583 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(citing Caruso v. Ward, 554 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)).
141. N.Y. [PENAL] LAW § 400.00.11 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1997); NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADM. CODE § 10-131(a)(1) (1996).
142. See, e.g., In re Shapiro, 595 N.Y.S.2d 864, 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), aff'd,
607 N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (unfettered discretion of the Police
Commissioner in issuing and revoking gun licenses).
143. See, e.g., Cramer, supra note 2, at 684 (listing the names of wealthy and
influential individuals who have New York City firearms permits).
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C. State CourtDecisions
Throughout the years of inactivity of the United States Supreme Court in
the area of the Second Amendment, state courts largely have assumed leadership
in interpreting the meaning of the right to bear arms and the extent to which such
right restricts the power of the federal and state governments to regulate the
possession and use of firearms. Many state courts have viewed the right to bear
arms enshrined in state constitutions as an individual right, and one court even
1
described it as a "sacred right based upon the experience of the ages."'"
Generally, state courts have looked to several factors in deciding whether
a particular firearms control statute or regulation violates the constitutional right
to bear arms.
First, courts invariably engage in analyzing technical characteristics of the
firearms sought to be regulated, such as the ability to fire rounds in rapid
succession45 and the propensity to scatter bullets in a wide area.1 46 Some courts,
however, simply assume that a particular type of weapons is "dangerous,"
without undertaking an analysis of the technical features of the firearm. For
example, the Connecticut supreme court recently stated, without
discussion, that
"assault weapons pose an increasing risk to the society.'1 47
Second, state courts frequently consider the typical uses of the weapons
subject to state regulation. Under the prevailing analysis, only weapons that
typically are used for self-defense, protection of the state, or other purposes
enumerated in the constitutional provisions or sanctioned by the common law,
are entitled to protection. For example, in People v. Brown, the Michigan
Supreme Court observed that constitutional protection is not available for
weapons used by 'urban gangsters and rowdies.' 1 48 This analysis involves the

144. State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 223 (N.C. 1921). See also Aymette v. State,

21 Tenn. 152 (1840) ("[F]ree white men may keep arms to protect the public liberty, to
keep in awe those who are in power, and to maintain the supremacy of the laws and the
constitution....").
145. See, e.g., Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 332 (Colo. 1994)
(finding that assault weapons which the city attempted to proscribe were capable of a
rapid rate of fire as well as of capacity to fire an inordinately large number of rounds
without reloading).
146. See, e.g., State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)
(upholding the proscription on "weapons of mass death and destruction" defined to
include shotguns of certain length).
147. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1230, 1235 (Conn. 1995)
(evaluating certain "assault weapons," defined, inter alia, as "any selective-fire firearm
capable of fully automatic, semiautomatic or burst fire at the option of the user" as being
dangerous). Apparently, the drafters of the statute felt the ambiguity of that definition,
because they also included in the statute a list of specific weapons covered by the
legislation. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-202(a) (West 1994).
148. 235 N.W. 245, 247 (Mich. 1931).
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application of the civilized warfare test annunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Miller,'49 and subsequently utilized by many
state courts. 150
For example, the "typical use" test was thoughtfully applied by the
Washington Supreme Court in Seattle v. Montana,"' where the court considered
the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance prohibiting possession of a
"dangerous knife," defined in the ordinance as any "fixed-blade" knife or any
other knife with a blade more than 3.5 inches in length. 5 2 The court, noting that
the ordinance did not ban, but rather regulated, the possession and carrying of
certain knives, considered the knives in question to be outside the state
constitution because "any hard object can be used as a weapon, but it would be
absurd to give every knife ... constitutional protection as 'arms'. 1 5 3 The court
observed that the state constitution valued the right to bear arms "not because
arms are valued per se, but only to ensure self-defense or defense of others."' 54
Thus, under the court's rationale, a regulation concerning the exercise of the
right to bear arms, at a minimum, should not restrict the possession of arms in
such a way as to render it meaningless for self-defense of a person. The court
viewed "reasonable regulation" as permissible, and such regulation is certainly
consonant with the early United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the
Second Amendment. 55
Third, courts typically assess the breadth of the scope of the statute or
regulation in issue by comparing the number of firearms subject to regulation or
proscription with the number of weapons that are outside the legislation or
regulation under review. If the number of weapons in the latter category is far
larger than those sought to be restricted, the right to bear arms may not

149. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). See supra Part III.E for a discussion of the "civilized
warfare test." Briefly, the United States Supreme Court in Millerheld that only certain
weapons which could be used in militia activities were protected under the Second
Amendment. Id. at 178.
150. See, e.g., Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 666 (Fla. 1972) (legislature may
prohibit possession of weapons that are ordinarily used for criminal and improper
purposes and which are not among those constituting legitimate weapons of defense and
protection); State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 148 (W. Va.
1988) (same).
151. 919 P.2d 1218 (Wash. 1996). The court observed, in construing the word

"arms" that "[u]nder even the broadest possible construction, the term 'arms' extends
only to weapons designed as such, and not to every utensil, instrument, or thing which
might be used to strike or injure another person." Id. at 1222. The problem with this
definition is that it does not clearly define "arms" because many objects, such as a knife,
for example, while being designed as a weapon are also in common use for other
purposes (e.g., cooking).
152. Seattle, Wa., Municipal Code § 12A.14.010A (1996).

153. Montana, 919 P.2d at 1222.
154. Id. at 1224.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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necessarily be infringed. For example, regulation (short of a complete ban) of
the carrying of concealed weapons was held to be constitutional under the
Indiana Constitution because only a relatively small category of firearm use was
15 6
subject to regulation.
The extent of the "rationality" standard was at issue in City of Princetonv.
Buckner,' a case involving the carrying of a concealed semiautomatic pistol by
a drunk driver. The defendant claimed that his right to bear arms, under both
the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and the West Virginia
state constitutional provision relating to the right to bear arms, was violated.
The state supreme court recognized the right to individual self-defense under
both the federal and state constitutions and ruled that the state statute in question
impermissibly infringed upon the exercise of that right. The court further
proceeded to examine the scope of "reasonable regulation" of the possession of
firearms permitted under the state constitution.' 1 The Justices agreed with
decisions in other states that the right to bear arms is not absolute, noting that the
West Virginia constitution was one of the few state constitutions expressly
guaranteeing the right to individual self-defense."5 9 The significance of Buckner
lies in its holding that the state cannot rationally prohibit the carrying of all
weapons that legitimately may be used for the protection of an individual, based
on the acknowledgment by the court that the state constitution, along with its
6
federal counterpart, guarantees an individual right to bear arms. 1
An appropriate illustration of the degree of scrutiny to which state courts
may subject state regulatory schemes aimed at gun ownership is a series of
decisions rendered by Oregon state courts. The Oregon Supreme Court decided
several cases related to the state constitutional provision guaranteeing the right
to bear arms.' 6 ' Relatively recently, in State v. Delgado,62 the court examined
156. Matthews v. State, 148 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1958). See also Robertson v. City
of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 333 (Colo. 1994) (statute banning certain assault weapons
partially valid because "there are literally hundreds of alternative ways in which citizens
may exercise the right to bear arms in self-defense").
157. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988).
158. Id. Several other courts have conditioned regulation of firearm possession on
the "reasonableness" of state statutes. A Michigan court held that possession of a stun
gun capable of generating a charge of 50,000 volts could "reasonably" be prohibited by
the state because defending the state and individuals did not require such weapons.
People v. Smelter, 437 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
159. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 147.
160. Id. at 147-49. The Buckner Court in its analysis referred to the United States
Supreme Court precedent set in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The state
court's holding that reasonable regulation of the right to arms is permissible is consonant
with the U.S. Supreme Court's discussion in Miller.
161. Oregon right to bear arms clause provides that "[t]he people shall have the
right to keep and bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state, but the military
shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power." OR. CONST. art. 1,§ 27.
162. State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610 (Or. 1984).
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a state statute (modeled after the federal Anti-Switchblade Act)1 63 which
prohibited the possession and carrying of switchblade knives. The court noted
that the Oregon constitution contained a broad provision that was intended to
insure the right to bear arms not only to an organized militia, but also to private
citizens!" 4 Based on the constitutional provision, the court examined the state
statute, which contained a blanket ban on both possession and carrying of
switchblade knives. The Justices carefully considered arguments advanced by
the state that the Oregon constitution protected only weapons used for defense.
The court rejected such distinction between defensive and offensive weapons,
noting that it was "unpersuaded by this distinction that the state urges of
'offensive' and 'defensive' weapons."'165 Instead, the Justices, delving into the
history of the manufacture and uses of switchblade knives, concluded that such
weapons were of a kind "commonly used by individuals for personal defense
during either the revolutionary and post-revolutionary era, or in 1859 when
Oregon's constitution was adopted. 1 66 The court qualified its opinion by
referring to an earlier decision, where it stated that individuals do not have an
unfettered right to possess or use constitutionally protected arms in any way they
please. Such use may be subject to reasonable regulation by the state
legislature.167 Significantly, municipalities in Oregon are not prevented from
regulating the use of dangerous weapons on their
own, subject to the same
68
constitutional constraints as the state legislation.1
Fourth, the last element of the constitutionality analysis allows reasonable
regulation by the government of the manner in which firearms are used. Several
state court decisions have supported regulation of the use and possession of
firearms (including a complete ban thereof) by particular classes of persons, such
as convicted felons, 69 or the carrying of weapons into establishments that sell

-

163. The Anti-Switchblade Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1241-44 (1994).
164. In State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94 (Or. 1980), the Oregon Supreme Court
examined the origins of the arms clause of the state constitution, concluding that the right
to bear arms included the use of certain weapons for the defense of person and property.
Id. at 98 ("[T]he term 'arms' ... include[s] weapons commonly used for either purpose
[personal or military defense], even if a particular weapon is unlikely to be used as a
militia weapon....').
165. Delgado, 692 P.2d at 612.
166. Id.
167. State v. Blocker, 630 P.2d 824, 826 (Or. 1981) (possession of a billy club is
constitutionally protected both outside and inside the personal residence, but its use may
be subject to regulation).
168. See Oregon State Shooting Ass'n v. Multnomah County, 858 P.2d 1315 (Or.
Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 877 P.2d 1202 (Or. 1994) (holding that municipal
ordinance regulating "assault weapons" is constitutional). Comparewith, KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 65.870 (Michie 1994) (prohibiting municipalities from enacting firearms
regulations).
169. See, e.g., People v. Blue, 544 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1975) (restrictions on firearms
possession by convicted felons).
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liquor. 7 ' However, such regulation by state governments is not without limits.
One state court aptly has observed that "[t]he constitutional right to bear arms
would be illusory, of course, if it could be abrogated on the basis of a mere
rational reason for restricting regulation."' 7' Thus, courts are likely to hold that
firearms regulation is not reasonable and cannot be upheld where the
government seeks effectively to ban completely the use or possession of firearms
by law-abiding citizens.' 72
The increased scrutiny to which many state courts subject the regulation of
the right to bear arms is illustrated in a series of decisions whereby various state
statutes and regulations were invalidated. Throughout the years, state courts
have stricken more than twenty state regulatory measures as unconstitutional. 73
To a certain extent, the multiplicity of state decisions affirming the right to bear
firearms under the applicable state constitutions reflects the lack of authoritative
pronouncements on this issue by the United States Supreme Court.
In short, state courts have developed a substantial body of law generally
interpreting the right to bear arms under the relevant state constitutional and
statutory provisions as belonging to individual citizens. Several courts also have
held that such right is a fundamental right predating the applicable state
constitutions and reflecting the natural right ideas of the early Republic with
respect to bearing firearms. The United States Supreme Court should carefully
examine those judicial precedents and follow them in developing Second
Amendment jurisprudence.

170. See, e.g., State v. Dees, 669 P.2d 261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (restrictions on
carrying of firearms into businesses that sell liquor to patrons).
171. Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226 (Conn. 1995) (regulation of assault
weapons).
172. See, e.g., In re Brickey, 70 P. 609 (Idaho 1902) (statute cannot prohibit
carrying of deadly weapons in all forms); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Wyo.
1986) (stating that regulation of firearms impermissible "in such a manner that it amounts
to the destruction of the right to bear arms"). Comparewith Quilici v. Village of Morton
Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1982) (local ordinance completely prohibiting
firearms not in violation of the Second Amendment).
173. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (Ark. 1878); City of Lakewood v.
Pillow, 501 P.2d 744 (Colo. 1972); People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1936);
Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145 (Kan. 1979); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90
(Ct. App. 1822); People v. Zerillo, 189 N.W. 927 (Mich. 1922); City of Las Vegas v.
Moberg, 485 P.2d 737 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Kemer, 107 S.E. 222 (N.C. 1921);
In re Reilly, 31 Ohio Dec. 364 (Ohio Ct. App. 1919).
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V. EMPIRICAL DATA REGARDING GUN USE
The issue of gun control is laden with emotions, 74 and very little empirical
data have been offered so far to substantiate claims that proliferation of firearms
results in increased crime and fatality rates across the country. Many researchers
suggest, however, that statistical evidence points in the other direction. For
example, several recent publications of nation-wide studies of gun-related
homicides support the inference that liberal issuance of concealed firearm
permits does not contribute to the increase in gun violence, but may, conversely,
have facilitated the recent improvement in overall crime statistics in the United
75

States.

A. Effect ofMandatoryIssuanceLaws
Because of the great variation of gun licensing laws not only among states
but within individual states, generalizations which are abundant in the news
media about the crime statistics in different states fail to explain why state-wide
crime dynamics do not correspond to the ebb and flow of state gun regulation.
This is because, as described above, many counties within those states regulate
the possession of firearms on their own, and such regulation pay have a
profound effect on the state's overall gun ownership.' 76
An extensive study of the effects of "shall issue" concealed firearm laws at
the county level in various states between 1977 and 1992 concluded that certain
categories of crimes, such as murders, rapes and aggravated assaults, dropped
five to seven percent in counties where concealed weapon laws came into effect.
If the category of homicides is considered separately from other serious crimes
resulting in bodily injury, the reduction in crime, which apparently is attributable

174. See, e.g., Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, Firearm Facts,
http://www.handguncontrol.org/protecting/D4/d4firefc.htm.(visited Feb. 2, 1997)
(picturing the "horrific levels" of gun related violence in the United States by comparing
homicide statistics in major developed countries. With 13,495 deaths in 1992 (last year
for which an FBI crime statistics are available), the United States was by far the leader).
See also Samuel Fields, Guns, CrimeAnd The Negligent Gun Owner, 10 N. KY. L. REV.
140 (1983) (advocating gun control because of the allegedly high contribution of
negligent gun owners to violent crime).
175. See, e.g., Lott,supranote 2, at 1; Cramer, supra note 2, at 679; Kleck, supra
note 2, at 150; David T. Hardy, Legal Restriction of FirearmOwnership as an Answer
to Violent Crime: What Was the Question?,6 HAMLINE L. REV.391 (1983).
176. To illustrate, until recently Fairfax county in Virginia, with a population of
over 800,000, had only 10 gun owners with concealed gun permits, although Virginia as
a whole has been considered a state liberally issuing gun licenses. See Cramer, supra
note 2, at 695; Lott, supra note 2, at 8.
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to liberalized issuance of concealed gun permits, is much more dramatic--eighthundred percent. 7
Even more significantly, the Lott and Mustard study found that the number
of accidental deaths ascribed to the wider availability of firearms in the "shall
issue" states did not increase and remains insignificant compared with the
overall number of accidental deaths in the United States.' According to the
National Rifle Association, the number of fatal accidents involving firearms was
at an all-time low in 1992, the most recent year for which statistical data are
published.'79 These findings refute the concern that easy access to firearms
could increase the number of accidental fatalities because the populace is usually
perceived as inexperienced in handling firearms.3 0 The Lott and Mustard study
shows that an increase in accidental deaths due to the passage of concealed
firearm laws is statistically insignificant and is vastly outnumbered by other
causes of death, even taking into account the negative effects of anti-gun
propaganda by gun-control groups, which contributes to popular ignorance and
results in more frequent misuse of firearms than would be the case otherwise.'
Another important conclusion of several authors is that, in the states
liberally issuing concealed firearm permits, property crimes increase
substantially and concurrently with the decrease in serious crimes such as
murder, rape and aggravated assault, which apparently reflects the reluctance of
criminals to encounter armed individuals.'
Taking into account costs to the
national economy of the loss of life and productive workforce,' estimates of

177. Lott, supra note 2, at 19 (comparing county-level data showing that the
enactment of a "shall issue" law affecting the firearms issuance policies by a particular
county may result in a 5% to 7% decrease in violent crime).
178. Lott, supranote 2, at 19-20 (liberalized issuance of concealed firearms permits
affects violent crime rates while not contributing to accidental deaths).
179. See National Rifle Association, Firearms Safety in the U.S. 1995,

http://www.nra.org/research/riasfs.htaml (visited Feb. 19, 1997) (indicating that firearms
accidents accounted for 1.6% of total accidental deaths in the United States in 1992).
180. See, e.g., Daniel W. Webster, et al., ReducingFirearmInjuries, Issues Sci. &
Tech. 73 (1991) (arguing that availability of firearms increases accidental deaths, and that
government, by failing to institute tougher regulation of firearms, ignores the role that
gun availability plays in suicides and unintentional shootings which together allegedly
constitute almost 60% of all gun related deaths).
181. Lott, supra note 2, at 64 (less than one additional death per state).
182. Lott, supranote 2, at 24 (overall increase in property crimes of 2.7%). The
increase in property crime rates apparently is attributable to the facts that criminals tend
to switch to less "dangerous" crimes such as theft where chances of encountering
resistance by the victim are much smaller than in a face-to-face confrontations (for
example, in an attempted rape) where criminals may perceive the increased risk of the
victim being armed and being likely to resist.
183. It could be argued that the people most likely to be affected by murder are
young male adults who otherwise would be engaged in productive economic activity.
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economic savings from the decrease in violent crime rates run in the billions of
dollars annually. 84 Such savings more than fully offset the economic loss
attributable to the increase in non-violent property crimes, Which amounts to less
than one billion dollars per year.
Empirical studies indicate that the liberalization of laws regulating
concealed weapons produces a long-term impact on crime dynamics. 185 Because
criminals have greater fear of armed resistance in counties where the probability
that the victim carries a gun is higher, the deterrent effect of concealed firearm
legislation increases over time as more people avail themselves of the
opportunity to obtain a gun.' 86 Further, studies that surveyed the dynamics of
gun ownership in the United States show that the general increase in the number
of firearms owned nation-wide by individuals does not result in corresponding
surge in the proportion of homicides
involving firearms as compared to the
87
overall homicide numbers.

B. Defensive Use ofFirearms
Several recent studies describe an interesting, and, so far, largely unnoticed
phenomenon related to a substantial use by private citizens in the United States
of firearms for personal protection. 88 These studies indicate that legitimate 89
use of weapons for self-defense far outweighs the usage of guns for criminal
purposes in this country. 90 Kleck and Gertz estimate the frequency of firearm
use for self-defense and protection of the user's household at a surprisingly high
number of 2.2 to 2.5 million instances per year.' This means, according to the
data, that a little less than four percent of U.S. households reported a gun use for

184. TED R. MILLER, ET AL., VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK
(1996).
185. See Kleck, supra note 2, at 166 (use of guns by victims tends to reduce the
likelihood of bodily harm due to the fear by criminals of potential armed resistance by
the victims).
186. See Kleck, supra note 2, at 166.
187. Hardy, supra note 173, at 394 (although handgun ownership in the United
States more than doubled to 52 million units between 1969 and 1980, the rate of domestic
homicides involving firearms remained constant at approximately 1.6 homicides per
100,000 population).
188. See, e.g., Kleck, supranote 2, at 150 (first nation-wide survey of gun use for
self-defense).
189. Legitimate from a policy standpoint advanced by the author, although in some
cases possibly violative of the applicable federal, state or local gun control laws and
ordinances as discussed in this Article.
190. Id. at 164.
191. "Firearm usage" for purposes of that study included not only cases where the
user actually shot at the aggressor, but also encounters where it was made known to the
aggressor that the victim was armed. Id. at 162-63.
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self-defense within a five-year period immediately prior to the survey.'
According to the government statistics for 1992, there were about 850,000
violent 19
crimes
committed around the country which involved the use of a
3
firearm.
Upon some reflection, however, the frequency of defensive firearm use
should not strike as particularly high, given the widespread private gun
ownership in the United States, which is currently estimated at over 220 million
units. In fact, Kleck and Gertz conclude in their study that the actual usage, after
taking into account unwillingness of many gun owners to admit participating in
socially controversial behavior, is likely to be even more widespread. 9 ' The
only important conclusion prompted by these findings is that the potential
presence of a firearm serves as a deterrent for criminals, and the wide
availability of weapons for private use allows individual citizens to effectively
protect themselves. In fact, in many instances, the victim does not have to
actually fire the gun for protection because just the theat of doing so normally
suffices.' 9 Although the subjective nature of the assessment of a particular lifethreatening situation by victims makes it almost impossible to quantify the
benefits of gun possession as a deterrent, estimates show that, at least in 300,000
cases nationwide annually, there is a high probability of a fatal result if the
victim were not armed.'96 This is a tangible benefit of liberalized issuance of
gun permits which should not be overlooked.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right to bear arms under the federal Constitution is a fundamental right
which antedates the federal Constitution. The importance of the right to bear
arms should be underscored by the United States Supreme Court, and any doubts
regarding its fundamental nature should be clarified by the Court. State court
decisions with respect to state counterparts of the Second Amendment could
serve as a useful model for that purpose. The High Court may soon find itself
at the cross-roads, compelled to clarify the meaning of the right to bear arms
under the Second Amendment.
Undoubtedly, the Second Amendment is a controversial provision in the
Constitution, and many may not like its broad guarantee of the right to bear arms
to citizens. However, the Constitution, whether one likes it or not, cannot be
simply disregarded. Should a majority of the population desire more restrictions

192. Id.
193. Id. at 169.
194. Id.
195. Only 24% of respondents in the Kleck and Gertz nation-wide study reported
actually firing the gun to protect themselves. Kleck, supra note 2, at 173.
196. Kleck, supra note 2, at 177.
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on the possession of firearms than currently exist, a constitutional amendment
should be undertaken.'97 The United States Supreme Court on several occasions
has indicated that such course of action is available. 8 Indeed, an authoritative
ruling by the High Court could put to rest the endless polemic regarding the
proper scope of the Second Amendment guarantee of firearms possession.

197. See, e.g., T. Markus Fink, Is the True Meaning of the Second Amendment
Really Such a Riddle? Tracingthe Historical "Originsof anAnglo-American Right," 39
How. L.J. 411, 434 (1995) (arguing for a constitutional amendment). See also Kopel,
supra note 2, at 1209 (same).
198. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 861 (1992) (overruling
a prior Supreme Court decision is possible where appropriate). Historically, several
Supreme Court decisions have been reversed through Constitutional amendments. See,
e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (reversed through the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (1895) (initial decision), reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (reversed by the
Sixteenth Amendment).
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